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Recent Developments
Stanberry v. State

I

n a case of first impression,
the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held in Stanberry v.
State, 343 Md. 720,684 A.2d 823
(1996), that a warrantless search of
a bus passenger's luggage during a
drug interdiction violated the
Fourth Amendment insofar as the
police unreasonably concluded the
luggage had been abandoned.
On
August
16,
1993,
plainclothes Maryland State
Troopers were monitoring buses at
the Maryland House rest stop on
Interstate 95 in connection with
drug interdiction activities.
A
Greyhound passenger bus carrying
defendant Labaron Stanberry
("Stanberry")
arrived
from
Newark, New Jersey. The passengers disembarked to use the rest
stop's facilities, after which time
the troopers advised the bus driver
of the pending interdiction. When
the troopers believed that all the
passengers had returned to the bus,
they went aboard and asked the
passengers to identify their baggage. A suit bag in the overhead
luggage rack was unclaimed by
any of the passengers following
the troopers' inquiry. The troopers
opened it and found a bag of
cocaine and three smaller bags
each containing approximately 100
baggies of heroin. Stanberry, who
was the last of the passengers to
return to the bus from the rest stop,
was asked by the troopers if the
suit bag belonged to him. He
acknowledged, then denied its
ownership before finally admitting
that he was transporting the drugs
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to Virginia in exchange for $300.
He was arrested and charged with
possession with intent to distribute
and transporting a controlled dangerous substance into the state.
At his suppression hearing in
the Circuit Court of Maryland for
Harford County, Stanberry moved
to exclude the drugs on the basis
that the troopers' warrantless
search violated the Fourth Amendment and that his statement was
suppressible as fruit of that illegal
search. The State maintained that
the search was permissible under
the Fourth Amendment because
the troopers reasonably believed
that the bag was abandoned since
none of the passengers claimed it.
Stanberry testified that he had not
abandoned the bag, but that he
merely left it on the bus while he
went to use the facilities at the rest
stop. The suppression court, however, found that the police could
reasonably conclude that Stanberry
did abandon the bag and denied
the motion. As a result, Stanberry
was convicted and sentenced to
fifteen years imprisonment, with
all but three years suspended.

The Court of Special Appeals
of Maryland affirmed the conviction, holding that the search
was lawful and that the troopers'
belief that Stanberry had abandoned the bag was reasonable.
Stanberry's ensuing petition for
certiorari was granted by the Court
of Appeals of Maryland.
Stanberry's chief argument
was that, although the Fourth
Amendment's protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures
does not apply to abandoned
property, he had demonstrated no
intent to abandon the bag; thus the
search was illegal. Stanberry, 343
Md. at 730, 684 A.2d at 828. The
State countered that even if the bag
was not actually abandoned, the
search was justified because the
troopers reasonably believed that it
had been. ld. at 730, 684 A.2d at
828. The State also argued that the
warrantless search was conducted
in good faith. ld. at 731, 684 A.2d
at 828.
The court first observed that
drug interdiction activities in and
of themselves are constitutional.
ld. at 730, 684 A.2d at 828 (citing
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429
(1991)). The constitutionality of
drug interdictions conducted on
buses, however, had never before
been addressed by the Maryland
courts even though such operations
have become widely used in law
enforcement to the point where
"basic methods" now exist. ld. at
728, 684 A.2d at 827. The court
appeared to accept that the interdiction conducted by the Maryland
27.2 U. Balt. L.F. 83
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troopers in the case at bar, which
involved boarding the bus, asking
passengers to identify their luggage and searching "abandoned"
luggage, was consistent with these
basic methods. Id The court
stressed, however, that the constitution imposes certain limitations as articulated in Bostick,
where the United States Supreme
Court rejected the view then held
by the Florida courts that drug
interdictions on buses were per se
unconstitutional.
Stanberry at
729-30, 684 A.2d at 828. Under
Bostick, police may conduct an
interdiction in the manner undertaken by the Maryland troopers,
including making a request to
search a passenger's luggage, provided the officers do not convey a
message through force or authority
that compliance with that request
is required. Stanberry at 729-30,
684 A.2d at 828.
Having resolved the threshold
question of whether interdiction is
constitutional, the court turned to
the proper inquiry required to
assess Fourth Amendment protection with respect to searches
arising out of interdiction. The
court recognized that "the scope of
protection afforded by the Fourth
Amendment is defined in terms of
the individual's 'legitimate expectation of privacy.'" Id at 731,684
A.2d at 828 (quoting Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)).
Abandoning property, however,
effectively defeats that expectation. Id at 731, 684 A.2d at
829. Therefore, the issues for the
court were whether Stanberry had
a legitimate expectation of privacy
27.2 U. Bait. L.F. 84

in his suit bag and whether he in
fact abandoned the bag, thereby
surrendering the expectation of
privacy that would otherwise
preclude a warrantless search. Id.
The court of appeals concluded
that Stanberry did retain such an
expectation of privacy because the
suit bag had not been abandoned.
Id at 738-39, 684 A.2d at 832.
Strictly speaking, the property
abandonment-expectation
of
privacy question is, in the Fourth
Amendment context, often a
question of fact and is subjective
in nature, because the inquiry first
focuses on whether the property
owner actually expected a measure
of privacy. Id. at 732-33, 684
A.2d at 829. The facts necessarily
leading to this determination
result, however, from an objective
analysis to determine if the property owner manifested an intent to
abandon the property. Id. Here,
the court enumerated several key
factors: (1) the location of the
property; (2) how long it remained
in that location prior to the search;
(3) its condition at the time of the
search; (4) whether the owner
asked a third party to watch over
it; and (5) whether the owner
disclaimed or failed to claim the
property in response to police
questioning. Id at 733,684 A.2d
at 829-30 (citing Faulkner v. State,
317 Md. 441, 451,564 A.2d 785,
789-90 (1989)).
With respect to drug interdiction, the analysis centers
directly on the person's words and
actions. /d. at 737, 684 A.2d at
831. In particular, a court must
determine if there was an affirm-

ative disclaimer of ownership,
which ordinarily constitutes abandonment. Id at 737, 684 A.2d at
831-32. In the instant case, the
troopers wrongly concluded that
Stanberry's bag was abandoned
even though there had been no
affirmative disclaimer on his part
prior to the search of the bag. Id
at 738, 684 A.2d at 832.
Moreover, the court maintained, abandonment cannot be
inferred simply because a person
remains silent or refuses to cooperate with the police during
questioning. Id at 736, 684 A.2d
at 831. "[A] refusal to cooperate,
without more, does not furnish the
minimal level of objective justification needed . . . for a . . .
seizure." Id. (quoting Bostick, 501
U.S. at 437)). The court therefore
held that the troopers could not
infer that Stanberry abandoned his
suit bag when he temporarily left
the bus and the other passengers
did not respond to the troopers'
questioning. Id at 738-39, 684
A.2d at 832.
The court viewed these factors
in conjunction with the principle
that a person ordinarily maintains
a legitimate expectation of privacy
in the contents of luggage ("a
common repository for one's
personal effects . . . inevitably
associated with the expectation of
privacy.") Id at 734, 684 A.2d at
830 (quoting Arkansas v. Sanders,
442 U.S. 753, 762 (1979)). The
court concluded that Stanberry's
expectation of privacy was not
eliminated and analogized his
situation to a traveler who checks
baggage with an airline or a person
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who parks a car at a commercial
garage. Id at 734-35, 684 A.2d at
830-31. The court specifically restricted its holding to interdiction,
recognizing that individual privacy
interests must often give way to
situations in which the police,
acting under the "emergency-aid"
exception, are involved in the
preservation of human life. Id at
742-43, 684 A.2d at 834. The
"emergency-aid" exception is evident, for example, where the police
suspect that a person's luggage

contains an explosive device. Id.
at 743, 684 A.2d at 834.
Stanberry illustrates that
interdiction is now an accepted and
widely used weapon in a protracted war on drugs. Presumably,
law enforcement officials have
concluded that among the various
modes of passenger transportation,
buses are a popular choice for
interstate drug traffickers since,
relatively speaking, bus transportation is cheaper, bus travel and
bus terminals are more pervasive,

and security at bus terminals is
more attenuated than, for example,
at airports. It would seem that by
definition, interdiction activities
should command the highest level
of
procedural
safeguards.
Maryland's location along the
Interstate 95 corridor makes it
especially susceptible to the influx
of illegal drugs, and the Stanberry
opinion could impact interdictions
in other Interstate 95 corridor jurisdictions such as the District of
Columbia and Virginia.

27.2 U. Balt. L.F. 85
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